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6.1  Introduction 
The development of  international financial markets  over the past 
several years (like the development of domestic markets in the United 
States) is proceeding at a record pace. Trade in foreign stocks has risen 
dramatically in the United States and other countries, as have trades 
in  foreign corporate and government bonds; domestic  corporations 
issue debt denominated in foreign currencies and sold on foreign mar- 
kets. Trade in forward and futures markets has risen and the markets 
have proliferated.  Futures  markets on indexes of  assets have been 
formed; options trade has skyrocketed. Finally, currency swaps (and 
interest rate swaps), which permit  virtually  any state-contingent ar- 
rangements, have become commonplace. 
These developments raise many questions. What  is the source of 
demand for these assets? Why have these markets developed now and 
not earlier? What new opportunities for corporations and individuals 
do these markets offer? This paper discusses one major issue raised 
by  these developments: the impact  of  sophisticated international fi- 
nancial markets on the effects of government policy. Specifically, this 
paper concentrates on the international effects of fiscal policies. One 
important question the paper  does not address is the nature of  the 
transition from a world with less developed to one with more developed 
international financial markets. Instead, the paper compares two worlds: 
one with and one without  sophisticated international asset markets. 
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The paper employs several models to make this comparison; the con- 
clusion that these markets  affect  the results does not  depend  on a 
specific model of fiscal policy. 
International financial markets permit individuals to trade over time 
and across prospective states of the world.  By  borrowing or lending 
with their counterparts in other countries, individuals can, for example, 
try  to eliminate  fluctuations  in  consumption caused  by  seasonal or 
cyclical variations in  domestic output. The extent of their success in 
this endeavor depends, in equilibrium, on the timing of similar output 
fluctuations in other countries. Intertemporal trade is one function of 
asset markets. In a world of uncertainty, they have a second function: 
asset markets permit  individuals to hedge against  unwanted  risk.  If 
domestic output is low in one state of the world and high in another, 
individuals can choose a portfolio of assets with a positive return in 
the former state and a negative return in the latter state. Future states 
of the world can be treated analogously to future periods of time. The 
extent to which domestic individuals can succeed in smoothing their 
consumption across states depends, in equilibrium, on the pattern of 
output across states in other countries. 
Consider a world  with two countries that are identical except for 
endowments. Country A receives an endowment of a perishable good 
X  and country B receives a perishable good  Y. Identical, infinite-lived, 
risk-adverse individuals inhabit these countries. Each has an instan- 
taneous utility function U(x)  + U(y),  where x and y are consumptions 
of goods X  and  Y. In a stationary equilibrium, country A exports to B 
half of its endowment of X  and imports half of country B’s endowment 
of  Y. Now introduce a simple government policy: the government of 
the domestic country imposes a lump-sum tax on domestic residents 
and uses the proceeds to make lump-sum (“foreign aid”) transfer pay- 
ments to residents  of  the  other country. The results of  this policy, 
according to the method of comparative statics on the model’s equi- 
librium, would be that wealth is redistributed. Domestic wealth falls 
and foreign wealth rises, so domestic consumption of each good falls 
and foreign consumption rises. Had this government policy been per- 
fectly anticipated, the results would have been the same in the absence 
of international financial markets. The results would also be the same, 
in the absence of international financial markets, if individuals had been 
uncertain about future government policies. Because everyone in the 
domestic country is identical by assumption, it is impossible to sell on 
domestic markets the risk inherent in uncertainty about future policy. 
Suppose that, in this example, there are international financial mar- 
kets in noncontingent claims, that is, simple borrowing and lending are 
allowed. Uncertainty about future government policy in the domestic 
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individuals to self-insure by  saving. Suppose the policy is imposed, 
randomly, in some periods and not in others. Individuals will consume 
less X  and  Y and save more in periods without the policy, that is, in 
periods when the government does not tax them to provide foreign aid. 
They will dissave in periods  with the policy in order to mitigate its 
effects. Foreigners will consume more in periods without the policy, 
in anticipation of possible foreign-aid receipts in some future period, 
and save in periods with the foreign aid. The size of the change in 
consumption immediately following the imposition of the government 
policy is smaller in the presence of borrowing and lending because loan 
markets permit consumption smoothing. The magnitude of these changes 
in saving and consumption, and of any associated change in interest 
rates, depends on how expectations of future policy change over time 
(which in turn depends on the stochastic process governing the policy), 
the curvature of the utility function, and so forth. Clearly, some self- 
insurance possibilities are present because of international capital mar- 
kets, though noncontingent claims are inferior to contingent claims for 
this purpose. 
Complete contingent claims would eliminate the effect of the actual 
policy on consumption in this example. Because all individuals have 
the same information and agree upon the relevant probability distri- 
butions in this example, they will choose to trade in claims, prior to 
the realization of the policy, that “undo” the income transfer from any 
potential policy. Because only the domestic government may impose 
this policy, foreigners are wealthier than domestic residents and will 
consume more every period, regardless of whether the domestic gov- 
ernment actually makes the transfers. Given the initial probabilities (at 
date 0) that the government will make transfers of particular sizes in 
various time  periods, actual imposition of a transfer  has no effects 
whatsoever. Introduction of complete international financial markets, 
therefore, has major implications regarding the effects of this policy. 
The treatment  of  government policy as uncertain  and exogenous 
deserves some comment. The assumption of exogeneity is inessential, 
though it corresponds to questions economists frequently ask, such as, 
“What  would be the effects of a rise in taxes?”  Government policy 
might well be the outcome of a political equilibrium with inputs such 
as lobbying, voting, and exogenous shifts in opportunities, which op- 
erate through political institutions that constrain bureaucrats, politi- 
cians, lobbyists, and voters. Generally, such a model will have elements 
of randomness attached to its inputs, so that resulting policies will be 
stochastic.  Policy can then  be treated as a stochastic process (that 
might be correlated with stochastic processes on other disturbances to 
the economy). Lucas (1976) and Cooley, LeRoy, and Raymon (1984a,b) 
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stochastic process on policy to be specified as part of the environment 
of constraints under which individuals maximize utility.  Lucas applied 
this argument to the investment tax credit and other policies; Cooley, 
LeRoy, and Raymon have applied the argument to policy on the growth 
rate of the money supply; Stockman and Dellas (1986) have applied it 
to tariffs; and Stockman and Hernandez (1987) have applied it to ex- 
change controls. Rather than changing government policy in a way that 
individuals thought was impossible when they maximized utility, the 
economist is constrained to consider changes in  policies that corre- 
spond to the probability distributions that are part of a fully specified 
economic environment that is known to individuals when they make 
their choices.2 
Without international financial markets (and abstracting from differ- 
ences across individuals within a country), the treatment of government 
policies as outcomes of a stochastic process has no effect on equilibrium 
allocations (though it may affect prices). Given the treatment of future 
government policy as part of the stochastic environment facing indi- 
viduals when they  make choices, the availability of  international fi- 
nancial markets in state-contingent claims can have major effects on 
the results of policies. 
When government policies are not simply redistributions, financial 
markets will not  simply “undo”  the policies. Generally, pure social 
gains and losses from policies will be  shared among participants in 
financial markets. Distortions introduced by policies, however, cannot 
be eliminated by financial markets: the substitution effects of policies 
will continue to operate. In Stockman and Dellas (1986), for example, 
the effects of tariffs are examined in a world with complete international 
asset markets.  In a two-country,  two-good world with trade due to 
differing endowments, a small tariff raises consumption of the export- 
able good and improves welfare in  the absence of financial markets. 
With these markets, however, a tariff reduces consumption: consump- 
tion of both goods is lower with a domestic tariff and no foreign tariff 
than with a foreign tariff and no domestic tariff. The existence of con- 
tingent assets, therefore, has a major impact on the positive implica- 
tions of the theory. The results obtain from the ability of these assets 
to eliminate income effects of changes in policy (as individuals spread 
wealth optimally across prospective states of the world), leaving sub- 
stitution effects in place. Rosen’s (1985) survey of  implicit contracts 
in labor economics makes a similar point about optimal contractual 
arrangements . 
The following sections of this paper present these examples in which 
the effects of fixed policy in an open economy are altered by the ex- 
istence  of  sophisticated international financial markets.  Section 6.2 
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this spending is productive and that nondistorting taxes are varied to 
maintain a balanced budget. Section 6.3 examines changes in distorting 
taxes holding fixed the government’s budget deficit. Finally, section 
6.4 examines changes in the budget deficit in an overlapping-generation 
model without Ricardian equivalence. 
6.2  Government Spending and International Financial Markets 
This section discusses the effects of increases in domestic govern- 
ment expenditures,  financed by  increases in lump-sum taxes on do- 
mestic  residents,  in  a two-country  world  with  complete contingent 
international asset markets, and contrasts the results with those in the 
absence of these markets. 
Government spending can serve a variety of roles. The effects of 
fiscal policy differ depending upon the type of government expenditures 
analyzed. This section develops a simple illustrative model of the in- 
ternational effects of  changes in productive government expenditure 
(e.g., on infrastructure). A key element of the model is that this pro- 
ductive expenditure does not affect all goods in the same way. The 
effects of a change in government spending are shown to depend on 
the availability of international asset markets. 
Consider a two-country world in which the domestic country is en- 
dowed with a tradeable good X and the foreign country is endowed 
with a tradeable good I: There is a representative, risk-averse, expected- 
utility-maximizing individual in each country who has instantaneous 
utility function U(x)  + Vb).  Purchases or consumption of X require(s) 
a productive input  to reduce  “transactions  costs”  that use  up real 
resources. They may include costs of shipping the good to its location 
of consumption, costs of  consuming the good, or costs of household 
production such as preparation, and so forth. It is simplest to assume 
that X, besides being a consumption good, is a productive input into 
this “transactions”  activity. X  can be used privately by an individual 
to produce transactions services, or it can be used by the government 
to produce a public good that has a positive marginal product for trans- 
actions services. One might think ofXas  a system of roads and bridges, 
police and security services, courts to enforce criminal law, or other 
productive public goods. These public goods interact with private pro- 
duction of  transactions  services and lower  private costs of a given 
volume of transactions. Let g be the level of government expenditure 
on these items (and neglect all other government spending). Individuals 
who wish to consume xo units of X must purchase xo8(g) units of X, 
where 8 - 1 > 0 of  the goods are used for transactions services and 
the rest are consumed. The productivity of government expenditures 
motivates the conditions 8’  < 0 and 8” > 0. 202  Alan C. Stockman 
The representative  individual in  the domestic country  maximizes 
expected utility of consumption of X and  Y in each state of the world 
z, x(z), and y(z), given the exogenous probability distribution F(z)  on 
states. So he maximizes 
(1) 
subject to the budget constraint, 
2 P'  U[x(z31 + VLY(Zf)l dF(z,). 
r=o 
where x  is the (state-independent) endowment of good X, and p(z,) and 
q(zr) are domestic present-value  state prices of X  and Y at date t. For 
example, if zor  is a possible value of z at date t, thenp(zor)  is the present- 
value (period  zero) price  of  X in  state zo at date t  in  the domestic 
country. The time subscripts on the functions inside the integral have 
been  suppressed. This formulation permits complete markets within 
the country. In the absence of complete international financial markets, 
state prices may differ across countries. For simplicity, I abstract from 
all uncertainty  except that  which enters through future government 
policy. The state vector can be written as 
(3)  z = (g,  g*), 
where g and g* are the levels of  government expenditure in the two 
countries.  The public-good aspects of  government  spending do not 
extend outside national boundaries, by assumption, so 8 depends only 
on g, and 8* depends only on g'; these functions will be written 8(g) 
and O*(g*). 
The representative  individual in  the foreign country has a similar 
maximization problem, though his utility function may be different and 
his budget constraint is different. He maximizes 
(4) 
subject to 
where asterisks denote foreign variables. While foreign and domestic 
state prices may differ in the absence of complete international financial 
markets, arbitrage in the goods market on a state-by-state basis guar- 
antees that the relative price of X in terms of  Y in each state is equal 
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In the absence of international financial markets, equilibrium requires 
that in whatever state materializes, world supply and demand are equated 
for each good, that is, 
(6)  X = e(g)x  + e*(g*)x* + g  + g*, 
P = y  + y*. 
In addition, equilibrium in domestic asset markets  (and similarly in 
foreign asset markets) requires that demands and  supplies of  state- 
contingent assets are equal. Because everyone is alike within a country, 
there are no net trades on these domestic asset markets. However, the 
equilibrium conditions can be used to price assets, that is, to find the 
prices at which individuals are satisfied with zero net trades. If asset 
prices  differ  across  countries  so that  for  some  z, p(z) #  p*(z) or 
q(z) # q*(z), then there are private gains from trade on international 
asset markets. 
Necessary conditions for utility maximization in each country and 
equilibrium conditions in the goods markets give three equations, for 
each date C,  in domestic consumption of each good and, with the nor- 
malization q = 1, the relative price p.  These are (with time subscripts 
suppressed): 
(74  vyx) = pev‘(y), 
(7b) 
17c) 
v*qX - ex -  g - g*)/e*i  = pe*v  (F -  y), 
pX = pex + y  + pg. 
Foreign allocations can then be determined from equilibrium conditions. 
Using the last equation to eliminate the price, the system reduces to 
two equations in two unknowns. Comparative statics can be used to 
determine the effects of changes in government spending in either coun- 
try. An increase in government spending may move the economy to- 
ward or away from the socially efficient level of spending. An increase 
in government spending in the domestic country raises domestic con- 
sumption of X  by lx0’dgl for any given gross domestic purchases of X; 
the cost is dg units of X.  The socially optimal level of X  is, therefore, 
implicitly given by x0’  = -  1. Similarly, the socially optimal level of 
foreign government spending is given implicitly by x*O*’ = - 1. The 
analysis of  changes in government spending is simplified by consid- 
eration of changes in g or g* around the socially optimal  point^.^ The 
results of total differentiation4 are then 
(84 
(8b) 
dx = [I/IT~IT~  -  IT~IT~)]  (~3~5  dg -  ~2~6  dg*), 
dy = [1/(~1~5  -  T~IT~)]  (1~17~6  dg’ -  7~31~4  dg), 
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(9)  7~1  =(X -  OX -  g)u"(x) - eu (x) < 0, 
7r2  =-yev'(y)  -  ev~)  2 0, 
7F3  =yO'V'  (y) < 0, 
 IT^ = -  e(X -  OX  -g)u*"(X")/o* - ev'  (x*) so, 
7r5 =ye*v(y*) - e*v  (ye)  < 0, 
n6 =yO*'v"' (y*) < 0. 
The sign of 7r2  depends on the elasticity of the domestic marginal utility 
of consumption of imports. If ry = -yV/V'  = 1, then 7r2  = 0. In that 
case, a rise in domestic government expenditures unambiguously in- 
creases domestic consumption of exportables and reduces the foreign 
consumption  of  that  good.  Even  with  a  separable  utility  function 
(U + V),  the increase in  domestic government spending may affect 
domestic imports. For example, if  ry and r,"  = -x*I/+"/U*'  are both 
equal to one, then  IT^ = 0 but ~4  >  0, so a rise in domestic government 
spending increases domestic imports as well as consumption of  ex- 
portables.  For small enough rx*,  imports will fall with an increase in 
government spending. A rise in foreign government spending leaves 
domestic consumption of  exportables unchanged  if  ry =  1, and in- 
creases or decreases x as r,, is greater than or less than 1. If ry is close 
to 1, then an increase in foreign government spending unambiguously 
raises domestic imports. The effects of changes in government spending 
frequently depend on the curvature of the utility functions, even when 
the utility functions are separable. As I will show below, these ambi- 
guities in the theory are removed once complete international financial 
markets are introduced. 
With complete international financial markets, state prices are equated 
across countries and equilibrium conditions for assets help determine 
allocations in goods markets as well as asset prices. World supply of 
each good in each state (and time) must equal demand, so the previously 
stated equilibrium conditions must hold for each z (and t). The equi- 
librium conditions, together with the necessary conditions for utility 
maximization, imply that, for every z, 
(10) 
(1 1) 
V*"F -  Y(Z)l  = + V'  Mz)l, 
U*'U -  x(z)e(g) -  g -  g*l/~*(g*)) 
= W"x(z)l 8*  (g*)/8(g), 
where +  is the ratio of the marginal utility of wealth of the representative 
foreign individual to the marginal utility of wealth of the representative 
domestic individual, i.e., the multiplier on equation (5)  divided by the 
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distribution F(z),  but it does not depend on realized values of g or g*. 
Equations (10) and (1 1) imply that, with complete international asset 
markets, consumption of y is independent of realizations of z. An econ- 
ometrician examining time-series or cross-sectional data would see no 
response of y to observed changes in z.  This contrasts with the am- 
biguous conclusions in the absence of any international asset markets. 
To determine the relation between increases in government spending 
and allocations, the second equation can be totally differentiated (with 
+  held fixed). Letting y(z) = 1 + x(g)e' (8) and y*(z) = 1 + x*(z)e*'(g*), 
the result is: 
(12)  (- v'0/e*  - v"+e*e) dx(z)=(-etute* +/02  + yv*if/e*)dg 
+ (v'e*'+/e  + y*u*"/e*)  dg*. 
The coefficient on dx(z) is positive. At the socially optimal g and g*, 
y = y* = 0. In that case, small changes in g  or g'  have no first-order 
effects on economic efficiency, the coefficient on dg is positive, and 
the coefficient on dg" is negative. An increase in domestic government 
spending  raises domestic consumption of  exportables, while an in- 
crease in foreign government spending reduces it. Because these results 
are obtained in the neighborhood of the social optimum, changes in g 
and g'  have no income effects. Therefore,  an increase in domestic 
government spending reduces foreign imports, while an increase  in 
foreign government spending raises them.6 These results on the effects 
of changes in productive government expenditure in the presence of 
sophisticated international financial markets contrast with the ambig- 
uous effects obtained in their absence. 
6.3.  Distorting Taxes 
Section 6.2 assumed that taxes were lump  sum. This section ex- 
amines  the effects of  changes in  distorting taxes with  and  without 
sophisticated international financial markets.  As in  section 6.2, the 
results illustrate that any effects of policy that operate through redis- 
tribution of wealth are eliminated by complete international financial 
markets. This section applies that principle to a tax on consumption. 
The tax might take the form of value-added tax or an income tax with 
various effective deductions or credits for saving, This section uses a 
two-country model similar to the one in section 6.2, but simplified to 
include only two time periods (the extension to more is straightforward) 
and a single consumption good that is endowed to both countries. When 
the timing of endowments differs across countries, there is an obvious 
role for financial markets: borrowing and lending will facilitate inter- 
temporal smoothing of consumption. Suppose that in  the first period 
the home endowment is small and the foreign endowment is large and 206  Alan C. Stockman 
that this is reversed in the second period. Then the home country will 
borrow from the foreign country in the first period and repay its loans 
in the second period. 
This  section will  examine the effects of  a temporary  increase  in 
domestic consumption taxes in the first period under several assump- 
tions about accompanying changes required by the government’s bud- 
get constraint. In the absence of international financial markets other 
than those for simple, noncontingent loans, a tax increase has a sub- 
stitution effect and an income effect. Starting from a situation of equal 
taxation in the two periods, a rise in first-period domestic taxes, with 
a lump-sum refund of the tax revenue, reduces the domestic demand 
for loans and lowers the interest rate at which the domestic country 
borrows. A small increase in taxes reduces first-period consumption 
and raises second-period consumption. These results are changed in 
the presence of complete international financial markets. 
Assume  the  representative  individual  in  the  domestic  country 
maximizes 
E[U(c, 1 - L) + PU(C’, 1 - L’)], 
where c and L are consumption and leisure, one unit of time is available 
each period, and primes denote second-period variables. For simplicity, 
it will be assumed that UlZ  = 0 (which does not affect the main results 
but reduces the algebra involved). Output, y, is a stochastic function 
of labor inputs: y  = aL, where a  is a positive random variable. Sim- 
ilarly, second-period output is y’ = a‘L’. The government taxes con- 
sumption at a rate 7. Define T = 1  + 7. Denote the present value of 
the state price of goods in state z by p(z). Initially, assume that changes 
in government spending accompany changes in  taxes and that  such 
spending is neutral (it is useless or it affects utility in a separable way). 
Changes in g and tax revenue are equal. Then the budget constraint 
facing the representative domestic individual is: 
Ja~  - Tc + p(a’L‘ - T’c’)  dz = 0, 
where 
(15)  z = (a,  a*,  T, T*,  a’,  a*’,  T’,  T*’) 
indexes states of the world, with asterisks denoting foreign variables. 
Implicitly, c, L, c’, L‘,  and p are functions of z. 
The foreign country has an analogous description that will  not be 
repeated here. In the absence of state-contingent international assets, 
but  with  noncontingent  international loan  markets, the budget  con- 
straint can be simplified, reflecting the zero net trades on internal asset 
markets due to the representative agent assumption. The budget con- 
straint with only noncontingent international loans is effectively 207  Fiscal Policies and International Financial Markets 
(16)  OlL - TC + p(~l’L’  - T’c‘) = 0, 




Together with  the necessary  conditions for utility  maximization  by 
individuals in each country who choose consumption and leisure in 
each  period,  this  generates  a  set of  equations  with  a solution  that 
depends on the concavity of utility and the relative  sizes of  various 
exogenous terms. The main elements of the solution for this case (with 
only noncontingent international loans) can be illustrated by assuming 
that labor supplies are fixed at unity, so countries receive stochastic 
endowments, a  and a*.  Then the model reduces to two equations in 
c and R: 
Equilibrium conditions are: 
aL + a*L* = c + c* + g  + g’, 
a’L’ + a*’L*’  = c‘ + c*’ + g’  + g”. 
(18) 
(19) 
U,(C)  = TRPE(Ul{[a‘  + R(c~  - Tc)]/T‘}/T’), 
Ll‘l(a + a* -  g -  g*  -c) 
= T*RPE(U*l{[a*’  -  R(a - Tc)]/T”}/T*’). 
Equation (18) follows from maximization of equation (13) subject to 
equation (16), and equation (19) follows from the analogous foreign 
maximization problem along with equation (1 7) and the balanced-budget 
assumption. Recall that government spending varies with tax revenue: 
Consider a realization of OL and a‘ for which c + g <  a  in equilibrium. 
This would happen if, for example, the countries are identical ex anre, 
if  (a,  a*)  and (a’,  a*’)  are independently  drawn, g = g’, and the re- 
alized value of a* exceeds that of a. Then the domestic country is a 
net borrower in the first period. Differentiation of equations (18)-(19) 
shows that (as long as c - a  is not too large) an increase in first-period 
domestic taxes reduces private consumption but has an indeterminate 
effect on aggregate demand and the interest rate because of the increase 
in government purchases. Second-period consumption, 
dg = cdT + (T - I)&. 
(20)  C’ = [a’ + R(a - Tc)]/T’, 
is also indeterminate. It depends on the direction of the interest rate 
change and the magnitudes of the substitution and wealth effects. 
The effects of  a consumption tax are changed when individuals have 
access to complete international financial markets. Then the equilib- 
rium conditions (17) must hold on a state-by-state basis. These con- 
ditions, and the necessary conditions for utility maximization in each 
country, imply 208  Alan C. Stockman 
(21)  U*,[aL(z)  + a*L*(z)  -  g -  g* -  c(z)l 
= +U,[C(Z)~  T*IT, 
U,[c(z)lIU,[1 - UZ)]  =  T/a, 
u*,[aL(z)  + a"L*(z)  - g -  g'  - c(z>l/ 
(22) 
(23) 
U,*[l - L*(z)]  = T*/a*, 
and 
(24)  ~(z)U,[c(z)]/p(z)T  = arbitrary constant 
for all z. In these equations, + is the ratio of the foreign marginal utility 
of wealth to the domestic marginal utility of wealth (a ratio of multipliers 
on the wealth constraints), and the constant in equation (24) is arbitrary 
because  one of  the  state prices  can  be  normalized  without  loss of 
generality.  The first three  sets of  equations  (for each  z), (21)-(23), 
determine production, trade, and consumption, and equation (24) then 
determines state prices. Another set of equations, identical in form to 
these, describes the solution for equilibrium in the second period. 
Total differentiation of equations (21)-(24) yields the effects of a high 
realization of domestic taxes in the first period, compared to another 
state with  a  lower  realization  of  domestic taxes. This comparison, 
across alternative realizations of taxes, requires that + be held fixed, 
because + is a function only of the probability distributions and other 
parameters  of  the  model,  not  of  subsequent realizations  of  random 
variables. Note that if L and L* are fixed, so that the model is one with 
endowments, then equation (2  1) alone, along with the government bud- 
get constraint, determines the effect of a change in taxes on consump- 
tion. In that case, an increase in T lowers domestic consumption and 
may raise or lower foreign consumption depending on the magnitude 
of the substitution effect in  the domestic country from the tax. The 
change in T, however, leaves second-period consumption unaffected  in 
each country. This result contrasts with the implication of  the model 
without state-contingent international asset markets. 
With endogenous production, domestic and foreign output move in 
the same direction, regardless of whether output rises because of the 
increased demand by  the government or falls because of the reduced 
demand by domestic individuals.'  (This result is, however,  sensitive 
to the assumption that utility is separable in goods and leisure.) Unlike 
the case in which international financial markets are limited to non- 
contingent bonds, a change in taxes and government spending in the 
first period  leaves output  in  each  country  unaffected  in  the  second 
period. 
The assumption that government spending has no effect on marginal 
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(1985) have estimated that roughly one-third of government consump- 
tion can be treated as if it were private consumption. It is straightfor- 
ward to examine the implications of the model of government spending 
is a direct substitute for private spending. Consider the extreme case 
in which instantaneous utility depends on leisure and on c + g, the 
sum of  private and government consumption. As long as g  is below 
the level of consumption that would be chosen privately, this is equiv- 
alent to a lump-sum transfer to the public of the revenue obtained from 
the consumption tax.  (Individuals effectively obtain this transfer by 
reducing private expenditure on the good as government expenditure 
rises.) Assume also that the countries are identical ex ante. In this case, 
an increase in first-period domestic taxes unambiguously reduces out- 
put in each country, reduces domestic consumption, and raises foreign 
consumption.8 Intuitively, complete international capital markets elim- 
inate the direct income effects of the policy but leave the substitution 
effect. Higher consumption taxes reduce domestic demand in the first 
period. If world output were unchanged, as in the endowment model, 
then consumption in  the foreign country would unambiguously rise. 
Foreign individuals attempt to spread this gain to current leisure as 
well as to future consumption and leisure. Asset trades have previously 
guaranteed that any increase in consumption of goods or leisure, not 
due to a substitution effect, will be  shared by foreign and domestic 
individuals. The net results are an increase in foreign consumption and 
decreases in output in each country associated with the fall in domestic 
consumption. In this case, an increase in government spending and 
taxes has a contractionary effect on output in each country, a con- 
tractionary effect on domestic consumption, and an expansionary effect 
on foreign consumption. 
6.4  Budget Deficits without Debt Neutrality 
In this section I build upon the work by Frenkel and Razin (1986) 
on the international transmission of budget deficits. Frenkel and Razin 
apply Blanchard’s (1985) model of  uncertain lifetimes to analyze the 
international implications of fiscal policies, and they demonstrate that, 
in  the absence of  Ricardian equivalence, government budget deficits 
may increase domestic aggregate demand but can be transmitted neg- 
atively to the rest of the world, decreasing foreign aggregate demand. 
This section takes the Frenkel-Razin model as a point of departure and 
introduces complete international financial markets, subject to the nat- 
ural  limitation that the unborn cannot  trade in  these markets.  The 
results indicate that in the presence of these asset markets, the effects 
of deficits on the current account and other variables is very different 
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I follow the setup of Frenkel and Razin.  There are two countries 
with representative individual consumers (in equal numbers) and two 
governments. A single good is endowed to these two countries, and 
the endowments follow an exogenous stochastic process. The descrip- 
tion of  the two countries is identical: each country is essentially de- 
scribed by Blanchard's model. Foreign variables are denoted with an 
asterisk. Individuals face a fixed probability of  death in each period, 
regardless of age, denoted (1 - a), where cr is the survival probability. 
They contract with life insurance companies that collect an individual's 
assets and liabilities upon his death. Yaari (1965) discusses the equiv- 
alence between these companies and a set of annuity and bond markets. 
A transversality condition requires that the limit (as the length of life 
goes to infinity) of the present value of net assets is nonnegative, so 
an individual does not borrow an unrestricted amount in the expectation 
that the life insurance company will bail him out when he dies. Insur- 
ance companies are perfectly  competitive and operate costlessly so 
that insurance premiums are proportional factors equal to the proba- 
bility  of  death. Under these assumptions,  and with  a,  denoting the 
present value price of a good at date t, a,- ,/a,  is 1 plus the one-period 
interest rate at t - 1; &'/at is  1 plus the life insurance premium at 
t - 1; and the gross interest rate (including the insurance premium) 
faced by an individual is ((~,-~cr-~/a,a~)-~.  The discount factor is fixed 
at S, and utility is time separable and instantaneously logarithmic; in- 
dividuals maximize expected utility. Following Blanchard (1983, ag- 
gregate consumption is then 
(25) 
where W, is aggregate wealth, which equals discounted disposable per- 
sonal income (discounted with the gross interest rate) minus private 
debt. In general, in  the  Frenkel-Razin  analysis, the probabilities  of 
death, discount rates, and so forth may differ across countries. It will 
be convenient here, though, to focus on the simplest case in which all 
these parameters are equal across countries. 
Governments in each country finance an exogenous stochastic pro- 
cess of spending, which has no effect on production or any marginal 
rates of substitution or marginal utilities, with either taxes or debt. The 
government,  which  lives forever, discounts at  a rate  that does  not 
incorporate an insurance premium. The present value of spending plus 
initial government debt equals the present value of taxes. 
The equilibrium condition in the world goods market at t  = 0 is 
c, = (1 - a6)  w,, 
(26)  (1 -  (YU) Wo + (1 - a*~*)  Wo* + go  + go'  = yo + yo*. 
Domestic and foreign wealth  at date zero are, in the Frenkel-Razin 
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(27)  wo =yo -  70 + Pvo 0, -  7)  + B,o  - &, 
(28) 
where PVo  (x) denotes the present value at date 0 of subsequent values 
of x, using the gross private discount factor, B,  is government debt at 
date 0 (so that future tax  liabilities and government debt  are both 
included in wealth), and Bo is net indebtedness at t  = 0 of the domestic 
consumers to  foreign consumers. To keep matters as simple as possible, 
assume that this initial private indebtedness is zero, that government 
debt is equal in each country, that current government spending is equal 
in each country, and that the probability distribution of future govern- 
ment spending is the same in the two countries. 
Following Frenkel and Razin, dates after t  = 0 are assumed to have, 
with probability 1, some constant levels of government spending, taxes, 
and outputs (which, while they are constant for t = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,  may 
differ from the values at t  = 0). Then the present value function is 
PVo(x) = x,uR/(l - d),  where x is the future (t = 1, 2, . . .) value 
of x and R is an average present-value price. Equations (26)-(28) then 
determine R and wealth in each country for given values in each country 
of government spending, initial government debt, taxes, output, and 
initial private indebtedness. 
Now consider a tax cut financed by increased government borrowing 
in the domestic country at t = 0. Assume that the foreign government 
has a balanced budget and that the domestic government budget was 
balanced prior to the tax cut. The government budget constraint implies 
that h0  +Rd~,/(l  -  R)  = 0, because taxes are raised  in all future 
periods (equally) to offset the current tax cut. Using this fact, differ- 
entiation of equations (26)-(28)  implies that the tax cut reduces R, that 
is, raises the interest rate, raises domestic wealth, and lowers foreign 
wealth (see Frenkel and Razin 1986). 
Consider now an extension of this analysis to incorporate complete 
international financial markets. The results above apply to a world in 
which individuals can trade on annuity markets with other residents 
of the same country (recall that the “insurance companies” are essen- 
tially annuity and bond markets), but they are unable to trade in con- 
tingent international financial  market^.^ In particular, suppose that it 
is possible to trade assets whose returns are contingent on the level of 
domestic taxes, and other assets whose returns are contingent on for- 
eign taxes. Then the risk of tax changes in either country can be shared 
internationally. Generations who are not yet born are unable to trade 
on these markets. In the absence of state-contingent international fi- 
nancial markets, domestic wealth (of currently living individuals) rises 
and foreign wealth falls from a cut in domestic taxes, while the reverse 
results from a cut in foreign taxes. In either case, the wealth of the 
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unborn  in the country with the tax cut also falls. Starting from this 
situation, domestic and foreign individuals can agree on mutually ben- 
eficial exchanges in which domestic individuals make payments if there 
is a cut in domestic taxes and receive payments if  there is a cut in 
foreign taxes. For simplicity, assume that the probability distributions 
of  future taxes are identical in the two countries. Because it is also 
assumed that tastes, horizons, government spending, and wealth are 
the same in the two countries, this makes the two countries symmetric 
ex ante, and these payments will equal exactly half of the tax cuts. 
Similarly, individuals in each country gain expected utility from sharing 
the risk of the subsequent tax increases associated with a current tax 
cut. With the symmetry assumptions, all individuals, regardless of  na- 
tionality, will share in the higher future domestic taxes associated with 
a tax cut; this occurs through liabilities that will be exchanged prior to 
the realization of policy. Domestic and foreign individuals can share 
the  risks by  exchanging obligations  so that  half  of  any tax  cut  (or 
increase) gets paid to (by) individuals in the other country (who, like 
domestic individuals, are liable for taxes for each year they are alive, 
but only those years). 
Given these financial trades that result in asset market equilibrium, 
a tax cut in either country increases wealth of currently living individ- 
uals in both countries. Their wealth can be expressed as 
(29)  WC,  = w,"  =yo -  ('TO + 'T,')/2  + PV&  -  (7 + 7*)/2] + B,, 
where y  = y* in each period and Bgo = Bg0*.  All individuals currently 
alive gain equally from a domestic tax cut. With the symmetry as- 
sumptions, the tax cut has no effect on the current account, though 
the interest rate rises due to the increase in aggregate demand. The 
rise in the interest rate reduces the quantity demanded to the level of 
the fixed supply of goods and, in equilibrium, the current consumption 
of each individual is unaffected. 
The currently unborn in the domestic country suffer a fall in wealth 
from a domestic tax cut at date zero. The loss cannot be shared with 
the currently unborn in the foreign country because none can partic- 
ipate in financial markets. The increased debt  sold by  the domestic 
government at date zero, when it cut taxes, was purchased in equal 
amounts by both foreign and domestic individuals. Therefore, the in- 
creased domestic government debt is distributed throughout the world. 
As currently living individuals age and die, they sell debt to new gen- 
erations. As older individuals sell debt to younger ones, the life-cycle 
path  of  consumption  is tilted:  the  young consume less and  the old 
consume more. This tilting is permanent and raises the real interest 
rate. The higher real interest rate, in turn, lowers the present value of 
future labor income and tends to reduce wealth. On the other hand, 
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individuals who were born after the tax cut differ from foreign indi- 
viduals born after the tax cut in one respect: the former must pay the 
higher domestic taxes. Consequently, whether foreign wealth rises or 
falls in the new steady state, domestic wealth is smaller than foreign 
wealth. Essentially, world wealth includes government bonds but does 
not include the full present value of the taxes associated with those 
bonds. This, alone, raises world wealth. But although the bonds are 
held by foreign as well as domestic individuals, only the latter pay the 
higher taxes in the future. Therefore, at the original interest rate, foreign 
wealth rises and domestic wealth may rise or fall. The tilting of con- 
sumption as the additional debt is passed across generations raises the 
interest rate and lowers the present value of any given income stream, 
so the higher interest rate reduces wealth in each country. Combining 
these two effects, a domestic tax cut has an indeterminate effect on 
steady-state wealth in  each country, though foreign wealth rises by 
more (or falls by less) than domestic wealth. 
The international impact of a domestic tax cut in the short run and 
during the transition to a new steady state is markedly different in the 
presence of complete international financial markets, though the steady- 
state effects are not altered in kind. Although this example has assumed 
complete markets, one may expect that similar results apply to a world 
in which asset markets are more limited but still offer some opportu- 
nities for state-contingent trade. The presence of money and nominal 
bonds, for example, would introduce an asset with a state-contingent 
real return. 
6.5  Conclusions 
This paper has presented examples of changes in the international 
effects of fiscal policies that can result from the existence of sophis- 
ticated international  financial markets.  The examples have assumed 
complete markets. In many historical circumstances, it would be un- 
realistic  to assume that these markets were available to individuals 
either directly or indirectly through multinational corporations or fi- 
nancial intermediaries. However, the rapid development of these mar- 
kets makes it useful to examine their effects. The proper model for any 
empirical application would depend upon whether those markets are 
available in that time period or set of countries. The complete markets 
framework is a useful benchmark case. While the assumption of com- 
plete markets is unrealistic, so is the more common assumption that 
there are no markets for contingent claims. For many purposes, it is 
not clear that economists should have much confidence in the impli- 
cations of theoretical models, or interpretations of economic statistics, 
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International financial markets remove some of the ambiguities as- 
sociated with opposing income and substitution effects, lead to models 
with stronger predictions, and in  some cases reverse the effects of 
policies. These markets also tend to eliminate intrinsic dynamics that 
would otherwise occur through asset accumulation. (Dynamics could 
still be extrinsic or occur through other channels.) This is probably 
desirable, given that variations in real exchange rates exhibit very little 
dynamics and, instead, seem to be associated with “news.” 
The examples in  this paper  have treated policy as exogenous.  A 
model that explains why particular economic policies are chosen by 
the political process could be incorporated into the examples. Because 
gainers and losers from economic policies are affected  by  financial 
markets, the model of policy formulation will also be affected. 
There are many other fiscal policies, besides those examined above, 
whose effects would be altered by the ability of households to trade in 
financial markets. Personal and corporate income taxes, with provi- 
sions for miscellaneous deductions, credits, and exclusions, may have 
very different effects in the presence of financial markets than without 
them. The effects of increased uncertainty about future taxes-overall 
levels, the cross-sectional distribution of taxes, and the timing of  tax- 
ation-will  be  affected  by  the ability of  individuals to use financial 
markets to hedge this risk. The issue of changes in uncertainty raises 
an important question: Which variations in government policy can be 
hedged by financial markets and which cannot? With rational expec- 
tations and complete markets, individuals could hedge against all changes 
in future policies-including  changes in “policy  regimes.”  Which, if 
any, changes in policy (or “rules” or “regimes”) are individuals unable 
to insure against? For example, could a decision maker in government 
choose to make policy decisions diverge systematically from the prob- 
ability distribution governing these policies that is implicit in financial 
markets? Or would these implicit probability distributions always in- 
corporate the possibility that the decision maker would attempt to make 
decisions in this way? These are not academic, metaphysical issues, 
but substantive questions that are directly related to the effects of fiscal 
(and other) policies in the presence of contingent international financial 
markets. 
Notes 
1. I do not want to take a stand on whether Cooley, LeRoy, and Raymon 
are expanding on Lucas’s point or are, as they believe, in  disagreement with 
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2. This does not imply that individuals have perfect knowledge of all param- 
eters in the model.  It does imply, though, that individuals "know  that they 
don't know"  certain things. 
3. Given foreign consumption of X  and foreign government spending, do- 
mestic consumption is maximized by g such that x0'  = minus 1. Andrew Abel 
has correctly pointed out in his comments to this paper that while the world 
social optimum is characterized by x0'  = x*O*' = minus 1, this may not be 
the optimum for either country individually. Changes in g or g'  around some 
other value that might describe the equilibrium of a policy game between the 
two countries involve additional ambiguities  in the results. The  additional terms 
reflect changes in the distortion caused by not having government spending at 
the optimal level for the world. 
4. Substitution of equation (7c) into equations (7a) and (7b) gives: 
(X  -  ex -  g) u' (x)  = ev' b)y, 
(X  - ex -  g) CJ" [(R -  ex -  g -  g*)/8*1 
= y 0*V'(  I  -  y). 
Recall that 0  = 0(g)  and 8'  = 0*(g*).  Total differentiation gives: 
which reduces to equations (8) and (9) if  x0' = re" =  I. 
5. Letting A and A'  be the domestic and foreign marginal utilities of wealth, 
necessary conditions for maximization of equation (1) subject to equation (2) 
include, for every z and t, 
P*U"x(z)l =  h ~(z)  0(g), 
P*V[Y(z)l = A  9(z). 
Similarly, the foreign maximization problem yields necessary conditions 
P'U'[x'(z)l = A'  p*(z)  0'(g*), 
P*V'ty*(z)l = A'  q'(z). 
Dividing these equations, noting that state prices are equated internationally 
so p(z) = p*(z)  and 9(z) = q*(z),  and using equilibrium conditions to eliminate 
x'(z) and y*(z),  yields equations (10) and (ll), where I$ = X*/A. 
6. If y # 0 then the coefficient on  dg includes an additional term. This term 
is negative if  y > 0, reflecting an inefficiently  large g, or positive  if  y < 0, 
reflecting a suboptimal  g. A change in g away from the social optimum increases 
the magnitude of the inefficiency and lowers consumption of X in both coun- 
tries. Similarly, a change in g toward the optimum reduces the inefficiency and 
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the coefficients on dg and dg'  in equation  (12) have terms involving y or y' 
with signs opposite to those of y and y'.  These results illustrate that any income 
effects from efficiency gains or losses are shared internationally. 
7. This result follows directly from equations (21)-(23), which imply that 
+U*(1 - L)/a =  &*(I  - L')/a*. 
Given a  and a*  (and +), L and L* move together. 
8. Modifying the model so that utility depends on c + g,  necessary  condi- 
tions for utility maximization, equilibrium conditions, and government budget 
constraints g = (T - 1)c and g" = (T* - l)c*  imply, in the case with (ex  ante) 
identical countries. 
aUII(Tdc + cdn= -TU22dL + &dT, 
uUII(Tdc* + cdT*)= -  TU22dL* + UZdT', 
a(dL + dL') = T(dc+ dc')  + c(dT + dT*), 
Using the first two equations to eliminate dc and dc* and solving for dL and 
T*UIl(Tdc + cdT) + UldT'=TUII(Tdc'  + CdT') + UldT. 








-  _- 
_-  -  > 0. 
u22  [z]  2a2UII  + 2TUz2 
9. An alternative story consistent with the previous analysis is that individ- 
uals do not have rational expectations about possible changes in policy, instead 
attributing zero probability  to a tax cut. 
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Comment  Andrew B. Abel 
Alan Stockman’s paper presents a few simple models to illustrate the 
important insight that the effects of fiscal policy depend very much on 
the nature of international financial markets. This general and powerful 
insight has a long tradition in the international economics literature 
based on the Mundell-Fleming model and the scores of papers which 
have extended and refined the original analysis of  fiscal policy under 
fixed and flexible exchange rates.  Stockman’s paper differs from this 
tradition both in its mode of analysis and in the economic phenomena 
on which it focuses.  Stockman analyzes the aggregate effects of  tax 
policy in a rational expectations  model with maximizing consumers and 
flexible prices. Rather than focusing on the implications of alternative 
exchange rate regimes, he focuses on the implications of the degree to 
which tax liability risk can be diversified internationally. 
Fiscal Policy in the Absence of International Insurance 
Stockman presents three models in his paper to demonstrate that his 
general conclusions are robust with respect to various changes in the 
model. My discussion will focus only on the first of the three models. 
Furthermore, to make  the discussion  simple,  I  will  analyze  a  very 
special case of this model. Since the intertemporal aspects of the model 
do not drive the results, I will dispense with them and analyze a one- 
period world economy. The representative domestic consumer has the 
utility function 
(1)  In x(z)  + In  y(z), 
where x(z) is the domestic consumption of the domestic endowment 
good (say good X)  in state z and y(z) is the domestic consumption of 
the foreign endowment good (say good Y)  in state z. In order to  consume 
Andrew B. Abel is Arnoco Foundation Term  Professor of  Finance at  the Wharton 
School, University of Pennsylvania, and a research associate of the National Bureau of 
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one unit of good X,  a domestic consumer must purchase  8 units of 
good X;  a foreign consumer must purchase 8" units of good X to con- 
sume one unit of this good. 
The domestic government purchases g 2  0 units of good X, and the 
foreign government purchases g" 2  0 units of good X.  Each government 
finances its purchases by lump-sum taxes on its own residents. Gov- 
ernment purchases are useful in allowing consumers to transform ex- 
penditure on good X  into consumption of good X.  In particular, 8 =  8(g), 
8' < 0, 8" > 0, and 8'  = O'(g*), 8*' < 0,  8*" > 0.  Stockman's major 
conclusion  continues to hold  if  8 and 8'  are invariant to g and g*, 
respectively, but I retain his assumption that government spending is 
useful in order to comment on Stockman's presentation of the socially 
optimal fiscal policy. 
Let p(z)  be the domestic country's terms of trade in  state z. More 
precisely, p(z)  is the price of good X  in terms of good  I: Finally, let R 
and  be the endowments of the representative domestic and foreign 
consumers, respectively. 
The assumption  of  logarithmic  utility  implies that  domestic  con- 
sumers will allocate their disposable income &)@  -  g)  to equate the 
expenditure on good X,  p(z)e(g)x(z),  to the expenditure on good Y, y(z). 
Therefore, 
(2) 
(3)  Y(Z) = P(Z)%?)X(Z). 
X(Z) = (X  -  g)/(2e), 
Since the residents of each country equate the expenditure on good X 
and the expenditure on good  Y,  it must be the case that worldwide 
private expenditure on X,  p(z)@ -  g -  g")  is equal to worldwide pri- 
vate expenditure on  Y,  E Therefore, we obtain 
(4) 
Substituting equation (4) into equation (3), and the resulting equation 
into equation (2), yields 
(5) 
Now consider an increase in g.  Domestic (real) private expenditure 
on good X,  Ox,  falls in response to the increase in g.  In addition, the 
terms of trade improves (p(z)  increases), and, if g'  > 0, domestic con- 
sumption of good  Y  increases. 
Fiscal Policy in the Presence of International Insurance 
Now we consider a world economy with well-developed international 
financial markets. In this one-period world, there is no scope for in- 
ternational borrowing or lending. The only scope for international fi- 
-- 
p(z) = Y/(X  -g  -&?*I. 
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nancial transactions is the international diversification of  fiscal policy 
risk. A representative domestic consumer will choose state-contingent 
consumptions  x(z) and y(z) to maximize expected utility. The associated 
Lagrangian is: 
(6) 
The first-order conditions can be written as 
L  = E{~w(z)  + I~Y(z) -  CL  [P(de(g)x(Z) 
+ Y(Z)  -  Az)(X - g)l). 
(7)  me(g)x(Z)  = P-1  = Y(z). 
Recalling the budget constraint E(p(z)B(g)x(z)  + y(z)} = E(p(z)(X -  g)}, 
we can use equation (7) to obtain 
(8) 
The terms of trade are the same as in equation  (4) so that using equations 
(4), (7),  and (8) we obtain 
p-’  = E(p(z)(X - g)}/2. 
(9) 
(10) 
Now  consider a large realization of  g. As in  the absence of  inter- 
national financial markets, real private domestic expenditure on good 
X,  Ox,  is reduced by an increase in g. However, contrary to the result 
in  the absence of  international financial markets, the domestic con- 
sumption of  good  Y is invariant to the realization of g. This example 
illustrates Stockman’s main point. More generally, Stockman’s result 
may  be described as follows: International financial markets permit 
risk sharing of country-specific risks. If (a) the marginal utility of good 
Y is independent of the consumption of  good X,  (b) fiscal policy does 
not drive a wedge between the domestic and foreign prices of good  Y, 
and (c) fiscal policy does not affect the supply of  good  Y available to 
the worldwide private sector, then optimal risk  sharing implies that 
domestic and foreign consumption of good Yare each invariant to the 
realization of  fiscal policy. 
Regime Changes 
Although the fundamental logic of  Stockman’s result is sound, one 
might argue with his interpretation of  fiscal policy. In Stockman’s model, 
the observed time series of  fiscal policy is a sequence of  realizations 
of  an exogenous stochastic process. In this view the “policymaker” 
is extremely ineffectual. Even if we  were to untie the policymaker’s 
hands and let him choose the realization of  g, his freedom of  choice 
is  still limited in  the long run.  If  we  are to plausibly maintain the 
assumption of rational expectations, then the frequency distribution of 
X(Z)  = ~{i  + g*/(X - g -g*)} (X  - g -  g*)/2e, 
y(z) = E{  1 + g*/(X - g - g*)}  F/2. 220  Alan C. Stockman 
his choices for g must match the ex ante distribution specified in the 
consumer’s maximization problem. 
An alternative analysis of fiscal policy using Stockman’s model would 
begin by defining a regime as a stochastic process for g and g‘. A policy 
regime change would be a change in the stochastic process governing 
g and g’. Of course, this merely shifts the problem back one step in a 
way that I will elaborate below. First, however, I will briefly discuss 
the effects of a regime change. A change in the stochastic process for 
g and g’  changes the marginal utility of income. The effects on domestic 
consumption would appear in equations (9) and (10) by changing E{ 1  + 
g*/@ -  g -  g*)}.  As an example, suppose that the density function of 
g depends on the parameter a.  In particular, let the density function 
be written as Ag - a),  so that a  is simply a location parameter; an 
increase in a  shifts the density function of g to the right by an equal 
amount. With this specification, an increase in a  increases the mean 
value of g and, since it increases the value of E{ 1 + g*/@ -  g - g*)}, 
it also raises domestic consumption of good  Y  This result is qualita- 
tively the same as in the absence of international  financial markets, 
despite the availability of  insurance against  the  realization  of  fiscal 
policy. The obvious counterpoint to this is, of course, that if interna- 
tional capital markets provided insurance against regime changes (i.e., 
changes in a)  as well as against realizations under a particular regime, 
then  the international  pattern  of  consumption of  good  Y  would  be 
invariant to fiscal policy. This example underscores Stockman’s con- 
cluding observation that the effectiveness of fiscal policy depends on 
the degree of availability of insurance against various changes in policy 
and/or policy regimes. 
A Counterexample 
Although the analysis of  a regime change in the preceding section 
seems to illustrate Stockman’s main point, it can also be used to con- 
struct a counterexample to Stockman’s finding that  under complete 
insurance, “[aln econometrician examining time-series or cross-sectional 
data would see no response of y to observed changes in z.” Consider 
an economy inhabited by a sequence of one-period-lived cohorts. Each 
period is described by the model above. In period t, the density func- 
tions of g, and g’, are given byf(g, - a,)  andf*(g*, - a*,).  The location 
parameters a,  and a*,  are deterministic but  time varying. Thus, the 
distributions of g, and g*, change deterministically over time, and the 
movements in this distribution (i.e., the policy regime changes) are not 
insurable. If  there are international  financial markets to share fiscal 
risk, then, as shown above, periods  with a high  value of  a,  will  be 
periods with a high value of domestic consumption of good  Y. In ad- 
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of  g, so that the covariance of g, and y, will be positive rather zero, 
even though there are perfect international insurance markets. 
Optimal Domestic Fiscal Policy 
My comments above concern the effects of international risk-sharing 
on the efficacy of fiscal policy and address the main point of Stockman's 
paper. I would also like to discuss the question of the optimal level of 
g in the absence of  international financial markets. Stockman states 
that  the  socially  optimal  level  of  domestic  fiscal  policy  satisfies 
xe'  = -  1. When this condition is satisfied, a one unit increase in g 
reduces worldwide private expenditure on good X  but raises domestic 
consumption of  good X by  one unit, for a given level of  domestic 
expenditure on good X,  thereby leaving worldwide private consumption 
of X  unchanged. While this condition characterizes the worldwide so- 
cial optimum, it does not characterize the level of domestic fiscal policy 
which  maximizes  domestic welfare.  The  reason  that  the  domestic 
welfare-maximizing level of  g differs from the level which maximizes 
worldwide welfare is that an increase in g improves the domestic econ- 
omy's terms of  trade. Substituting equations (2) and (5) into the utility 
function (I),  differentiating with respect to g (assuming that g'  is suf- 
ficiently small so that the second-order conditions are satisfied), and 
using the goods market equilibrium condition Ox  + 8*x* + g + g'  = X, 
we  obtain the following characterization of  optimal domestic fiscal 
policy from the point of  view of  the domestic economy: 
(1  1)  e'x =  -~*x*/(ox  + e*x*). 
As the  share of  the  domestic economy  in  the  world  economy ap- 
proaches zero, the right-hand side of  equation (1  1)  approaches -  1, 
and hence the characterization of domestically optimal fiscal policy in 
equation (1 1) approaches the characterization of socially optimal fiscal 
policy given by  Stockman. To  the extent that one would argue that 
political forces might lead  to optimal fiscal policy, the domestically 
optimal policy described in equation (I  I) would appear to be the out- 
come rather than the policy described by  Stockman. 
Comment  Patrick J. Kehoe 
The purpose of Stockman's paper is twofold: First, it promotes a type 
of  stochastic comparative statics (SCS) as an alternative to standard 
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deterministic comparative statics (DCS). Second, it  shows how  the 
degree of completeness of markets, here international  financial mar- 
kets, may be crucial for the SCS results. Stockman accomplishes this 
through a series of examples that clearly illustrate his points, and I 
have nothing to add to them. Instead I will expand on his two main 
themes. 
Comparative Statics: Deterministic Versus Stochastic 
When we study a dynamic economy, we are often concerned with 
how the economy will respond to various types of  shocks. We  would 
like to perform experiments in which these shocks can be interpreted 
as taking place in a single economy in real time, that is, calendar time. 
I argue that  there  is no  logically consistent  way  to carry out such 
experiments in a deterministic setting. However, in a stochastic setting 
such experiments are straightforward. 
In a deterministic setting, shocks are classified as either “unantici- 
pated”  or “anticipated.”  With unanticipated shocks we consider an 
economy in which agents are assumed to know the future with certainty 
and then we ask what happens if  some event unexpectedly occurs. 
This question is ill-posed, since we solve for an equilibrium conditional 
on certain assumptions which we then violate in our thought experi- 
ment. This makes our experiment internally inconsistent and, hence, 
nonsensical. 
A simple example should make this clear. Consider a world in which 
Stockman knows that his house will never burn down. Now suppose 
that it does. What happens? This question is ill-posed because if Stock- 
man knew his house could burn down, he would have had enough sense 
to have already bought some insurance-r  at least a fire extinguisher. 
More generally, the logical problem is the following. We  start by 
assuming there is, using Arrow’s terminology, a single possible state 
of the world. Part of this state includes Stockman’s house sitting there 
in  fine condition.  Given this state we define the natural  commodity 
space and we define preferences over this space. We  can then compute 
equilibrium allocations and welfare for this economy. However, serious 
problems arise if  we attempt to evaluate equilibrium allocations and 
welfare in some “unexpected” state of the world in which Stockman’s 
house has burned down. Since these allocations are not contained in 
our original commodity  space and our preference order is not even 
defined over such a point, I have no idea what the word welfare means 
in this context. 
In order to avoid a possible misunderstanding, I should expand on 
one small point.  If  we simply ignore these logical difficulties and in- 
terpret such experiments as if they were conducted in a truly stochastic 
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answer. In particular, if in the stochastic world either there is no pos- 
sibility for sharing risk-because  of the market structure or the physical 
environment4r  there is no value in sharing risk-because  agents are 
risk neutral-then  we will get the right answer in the analogue deter- 
ministic environment in  the sense that we will obtain the same nu- 
merical values for the consumption allocations either way. 
An  example of  such a stochastic environment is  a representative 
agent Lucas-tree economy, that is, a pure exchange economy populated 
by agents who have identical preferences and who, for every possible 
realization of uncertainty, have identical endowments. In such a model, 
no matter how we conduct our experiments, and no matter what we 
assume about markets, the equilibrium will always be “don’t trade and 
eat your own fruit.”  This may be a useful model for studying asset 
prices, but it is not very useful for studying trade. As soon as we add 
a little heterogeneity to this environment-either in preferences or in 
endowments-how  we conduct our thought experiments and what we 
assume about market structure become crucial. (For an analysis of how 
such experiments work in a Lucas model with heterogenous agents, 
see Backus and Kehoe [1987].) 
Finally, some may attempt to salvage DCS experiments as reasonable 
approximations to SCS experiments in which the shocks under con- 
sideration occur “rarely.”  However, they cannot be salvaged. For ex- 
ample, an SCS experiment in an economy where there is a small pos- 
itive probability of a house burning down will typically be vastly different 
from a DCS experiment in an economy where there is a zero probability 
of a house burning down. 
With the other type of deterministic shocks-the  anticipated shocks- 
we consider two distinct settings for some economically exogenous 
variable.  For each setting, we  solve for a separate perfect foresight 
equilibrium and then compare the endogenous variables, prices, and 
allocations across the equilibria. From this description it is clear that 
these comparisons cannot be interpreted as taking place in a single 
economy in real time. Rather, for economies specified at the country 
level, they should be interpreted as cross-country experiments. Thus, 
even though they are internally consistent, they are useless for many 
of the thought experiments we want to consider. 
In a stochastic setting, it is straightforward to model shocks that take 
place in real time. The basic algorithm for conducting consistent ex- 
periments involving a shock to an exogenous variable is the following: 
1.  Consider an economy in which agents place a positive probability 
on at least two values of this variable. 
2.  Compute one equilibrium in which agents engage in all mutually 
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3.  Draw different time paths of realizations of the exogenous stochastic 
4.  Compare equilibrium prices and allocations across these realizations. 
In this setup we can compute cross-moments between any variables 
of interest. (For interesting examples of this algorithm, see Svensson 
[I9851  and Stockman and Svensson [1985].) 
For some variables, such as endowments or productivity, these ex- 
periments have a straightforward interpretation. However, for govern- 
ment policy variables the interpretation is less clear. In his paper, Stock- 
man models government policies as exogenous stochastic variables. 
The policy experiments he considers are comparisons across realiza- 
tions of these processes. How should we interpret such experiments? 
That depends on the underlying model of government behavior. 
Suppose that we assume a government is a single administration that 
chooses a policy function to maximize its objectives. This function will 
have as arguments the state variables of the economy which include, 
among other things, all exogenous stochastic variables.  As in Stock- 
man’s model, government policy will follow a stochastic process. How- 
ever, there are some differences.  Basically, we have pushed the ex- 
ogenous uncertainty back to a deeper level: back from the level of  an 
institution called the government to the more primitive level of agents’ 
tastes and technology. As a result, policy introduces no new random- 
ness  into the economy.  Of  course, if  we  introduce  shocks into the 
government objective function, government policy will add to the ran- 
domness. However, if  we start building a model of these shocks, we 
will end up with them being functions of the original primitive shocks. 
Government policy will  again introduce no new  randomness.  I will 
discuss the implication of  this in a moment. For now, simply realize 
that in this interpretation we are investigating the operating character- 
istics of the economy under a single policy regime, where I define a 
regime to be a particular policy function of the government. Note that 
although we can give the word regime many reasonable definitions, I 
will use it in the concrete sense just described. 
Suppose now, however,  that we are interested  in  comparing out- 
comes across regimes. One way to do this is to specify two different 
objective functions for the government and then solve for two equilib- 
ria. In the first equilibrium, agents correctly believe that with proba- 
bility  1  the government maximizes the first objective function; in the 
second equilibrium, agents correctly believe that with probability  1 the 
government maximizes the second objective  function. Although we 
can compare the operating characteristics of these two regimes,  we 
cannot interpret comparisons across these equilibria as real-time ex- 
periments for the same reasons as before. 
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There is, however, an alternative to this type of experiment. Suppose 
that the government is composed of a sequence of administrations with 
possibly differing objective functions. Suppose, for simplicity, that there 
are only two possible administrations and that for some as-yet-to-be- 
specified process the government switches randomly between them. 
Then, for each administration we can solve for a policy function, and 
we can solve for a single equilibrium and consistently compare across 
these regimes. As far as I know, this is the only way to compare regimes 
consistently in a way that can be interpreted as taking place in a single 
economy in real time. (For a good exposition of these ideas, see Cooley, 
LeRoy, and Raymon [1984].) 
Since the main point of Stockman’s paper is to show how the degree 
of completeness of markets can affect SCS results, he does not need 
to develop a deep model of government behavior. However, the nature 
of  the underlying model is important for two reasons: it clarifies the 
possible  interpretations of  Stockman’s experiments, and it helps  us 
think about what financial markets we need in order to have complete 
markets. 
In Stockman’s model, the fundamental uncertainty is in government 
policy itself. In this setup, to have complete markets Stockman needs 
securities that pay off as functions of government policy. With casual 
reading, we may leave Stockman’s paper with the mistaken impression 
that if  we do not see securities that explicitly depend on government 
policies, then we necessarily have incomplete markets. With more care- 
ful reading, however, we realize that this is simply because Stockman 
took a useful shortcut in modeling government behavior. With a deeper 
model of government behavior, government policy will itself be a func- 
tion of  other stochastic variables, such as productivity. In this case, to 
have complete markets we do not need securities that depend on gov- 
ernment policy directly; we only need to have enough securities that 
are correlated with the primitive stochastic elements. 
Market Completeness and Stochastic Comparative Statics 
Stockman’s second purpose is to investigate how the degree of com- 
pleteness of international financial markets affects the results of SCS. 
To  show this, Stockman conducts experiments in two polar regimes: 
one with complete international financial markets and another with no 
international financial markets. The punchline of these examples is that 
the results may differ widely across the regimes. 
Loosely speaking, the intuition for these examples is as follows. With 
complete markets, optimal behavior by agents involves eliminating all 
diversifiable income effects, while with incomplete markets, agents are 
artificially constrained so that they cannot eliminate all of these effects. 
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SCS experiment, if the substitution effects go in the opposite direction 
of  the income  effects,  it  is possible to  have  experiments  that have 
opposite signs in the two cases. Basically, the income effects due to 
incomplete markets need to swamp the substitution effects. 
Since Stockman’s examples illustrate these points clearly, I will con- 
centrate on answering this question: Why should we be interested in 
knowing how the completeness of markets affects SCS results? 
A reason Stockman seems to favor is that the increasing sophisti- 
cation of  financial markets in countries like the United States means 
that we are moving from a regime of less complete markets to one of 
more complete markets. Thus, wisdom gleaned from the earlier stages 
of market development may soon prove faulty. I am not that comfort- 
able with this motivation. 
Another reason, which I find more appealing, is that this analysis 
may give us insight into which traditional trade theory results obtained 
using deterministic models will be overturned once we switch to sto- 
chastic models. This is because DCS results often are very similar to 
SCS results with incomplete markets. Basically, both get the income 
effects wrong in the same direction. Thus, if the completeness of mar- 
kets overturns an SCS experiment under incomplete markets, it may 
also overturn the analogous DCS experiment. 
A final reason is that Stockman’s paper is the beginning of a research 
project that investigates the effects of incomplete markets more broadly. 
If  this is true, then I would like to add a word of caution.  We  have 
learned from  Harris and Townsend  (1981)  that in terms of thinking 
about what it means for government policy to be optimal, there is a 
world of difference between an environment in which incomplete mar- 
kets are simply imposed and one in which markets are as complete as 
they can be, given the informational-spatial-communication  structure. 
If we are not careful, we may end up analyzing what Ed Prescott 
calls a “chicken model.”  The analysis of such a model goes something 
like this: First, assume that the private sector wants chickens but can’t 
make them. Next, assume that governments can make chickens. The 
amazing policy result is that in equilibrium the government should make 
chickens and supply them to the private sector. I hope we have more 
exciting things to work on than this. 
Of course, Stockman has not fallen into the chicken coop. Rather, 
he has provided us with a series of thought-provoking examples. 
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